Brains, Persons, and Society *** ABSTRACTS    Cervelli, Persone e Società ***ABSTRACTS

Temporal propositions

In modal logic, propositions are evaluated relative to possible worlds. A proposition may be true relative to a world w, and false relative to another world w’. A proposition whose truth-value varies across worlds is said to be contingent (as opposed to necessary). Similarly, in tense logic, propositions are evaluated relative to times. A proposition (e.g. the proposition that Socrates is sitting) may be true relative to a time t, and false relative to another time t’. A proposition that has this property is said to be temporal (as opposed to eternal).

Many philosophers object to the very idea of a temporal proposition, and  I will defend it in this talk. I will start with the Fregean objection, to the effect that such ‘propositions’ are incomplete. This will enable me to introduce the type of relativism I wish to defend : moderate relativism. Then I will discuss some of the other objections that have been levelled against temporal propositions. In particular, I will deal with their capacity to serve as content for the attitudes.