Brains, Persons, and Society *** ABSTRACTS
Cervelli, Persone e Società ***ABSTRACTS
propositions are evaluated relative to possible worlds. A proposition
true relative to a world w, and false
relative to another world w’. A
proposition whose truth-value varies across worlds is said to be contingent (as opposed to necessary).
Similarly, in tense logic,
propositions are evaluated relative to times. A proposition (e.g. the
proposition that Socrates is sitting) may be true relative to a time t, and false relative to another time t’.
A proposition that has this property
is said to be temporal (as opposed to
Many philosophers object to the very idea of a temporal proposition, and I will defend it in this talk. I will start with the Fregean objection, to the effect that such ‘propositions’ are incomplete. This will enable me to introduce the type of relativism I wish to defend : moderate relativism. Then I will discuss some of the other objections that have been levelled against temporal propositions. In particular, I will deal with their capacity to serve as content for the attitudes.