Brains, Persons, and Society *** ABSTRACTS
Cervelli, Persone e Società ***ABSTRACTS
Carla Bagnoli
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
The Authority of Moral Judgments
Moral judgments are authoritative: they bind us to act and to feel as
they command. While some argue that they are authoritative in a
peculiar manner, others deny that moral reasons have any sovereignty
over us or that they (should) override non moral considerations in our
deliberation. We make some progress in this dispute by distinguishing
several phenomena that are associated to the allegedly special
authority of moral judgements: their normativity (or authority narrowly
construed), normative resonance, importance, and deliberative priority.
I argue that we should account for the authority of moral judgments by
invoking a Kantian model
centered on mutual respect and recognition. The definition and defense
of this model is the main task of this paper. Within this model, I
argue for the thesis that judgments are authoritative if we conceive of
ourselves as their authors. Authorship, however, is not the solitary
realization of impartial spectators or isolated choosers, but the
achievement of agents that relate to others as "self-originating
sources of valid claims".
